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The Reverse-Batson: Wrestling with the Habeas
Remedy
Since the landmark case Batson v. Kentucky,' the use of Batson challenges
has become very popular in criminal cases to prevent prosecutors from
systematically excluding jurors based on race. Far less attention has been paid
to reverse-Batson challenges, where defense attorneys are challenged for
excluding jurors for race-based reasons.2 Batson is generally considered a
pro-defense doctrine in that it prevents overzealous prosecutors from appealing
to racial biases instead of evidence to obtain a guilty verdict. Yet in an ironic
extension of Batson,3 reverse-Batson challenges put defendants at risk when a
trial judge erroneously believes the defense counsel's use of peremptory
challenges is racially motivated. An improper granting of a reverse-Batson
challenge allows an individual who should have been excluded to sit on a jury
and evaluate a defendant's fate. What remedies are afforded to a defendant
convicted by a jury in a trial that contained an improperly granted
reverse-Batson challenge?
1. 476 U.S. 79 (198 6 ).
2. Batson itself never mentioned the reverse-Batson challenge, but alluded to it. See Batson, 476
U.S. at 1o8 ("The potential for racial prejudice, further, inheres in the defendant's challenge
as well."). For a thorough discussion of why defendants' discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges is harmful, see Audrey M. Fried, Fulfilling the Promise of Batson: Protecting Jurors
from the Use of Race-Based Peremptory Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311
(1997) (addressing a circuit split and arguing that a defendant should not be afforded a new
trial because his own attorney used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner).
3. The irony is that Batson's reach has become divorced from the social context that gave rise to
its holding. See Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 942 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing Batson's burden-shifting rule as a "product of the unique history of
racial discrimination in this country [that] should not be divorced from that context").
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The Supreme Court addressed a related issue last Term in Rivera v. Illinois,4
which held that a denial of a defendant's peremptory challenge does not
constitute a structural error requiring automatic reversal. The holding relied on
precedent that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally mandated' and
are not necessary for a fair trial.6 The Court concluded that when "a defendant
is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not challengeable for
cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state court's good-faith error
is not a matter of federal constitutional concern."7
Still at issue is whether criminal defendants can obtain habeas corpus relief
when they are denied peremptory strikes by a trial court's misapplication of
Batson and its progeny. This question is especially relevant for defendants who
have exhausted their state appeals and seek recourse at the federal level. Only
two circuit courts have addressed the issue and have come to completely
opposite conclusions. Petitioners convicted by jurors improperly included on
the jury as a result of a misapplication of Batson have no recourse to the writ in
the Second Circuit, whereas completely similarly situated petitioners in the
Seventh Circuit do. As the recent Rivera decision has taken automatic reversal
off the table, defendants convicted by improperly seated jurors may
increasingly look to the writ as a remedy.
This Comment argues that a trial court's violation of the clearly established
procedure for contesting peremptory strikes set down in Batson is cognizable
on habeas review and merits habeas relief. An improper granting of a
prosecution's reverse-Batson challenge is a denial of protections promised by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Second Circuit overlooks the
substantive difference between being denied the exercise of peremptory
challenges and being denied the protection of well-settled federal law
concerning the use of those challenges. The Supreme Court should provide
guidance so that lower courts do not erroneously believe they lack subject
matter jurisdiction to review the claims. Not only do federal courts have such
jurisdiction, but when presented with evidence that a defendant suffered a
4. 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009).
S. Id. at 1448. The Supreme Court has commented on occasion that peremptory challenges,
although a "means to achieve the constitutionally required end of an impartial jury," are not
themselves "of constitutional dimension." United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304,
307 (2000) (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)).
6. While proper application of Batson may "have resulted in a jury panel different from that
which would otherwise have decided [defendant's] case," there is no Sixth Amendment
violation because no member of the jury as finally composed was removable for cause. Ross,
487 U.S. at 87.




reverse-Batson violation, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) enables them to grant habeas relief.
8
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I will introduce Batson and its
progeny and explore the requirements for post-conviction habeas relief in light
of the AEDPA. Part II will describe the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit
split about whether reverse-Batson violations are cognizable for habeas review.
Part III will argue that the improper granting of a reverse-Batson motion
sufficiently violates "clearly established federal law" so that it merits habeas
review and relief.
I. BATSON AND ITS PROGENY: CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL
LAW
Habeas corpus review shall be available where a petitioner is in custody in
violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.9 In 1996,
after Congress passed and the President signed the AEDPA, the availability of
habeas review for post-conviction relief was greatly limited.'0 Even more
significant for reverse-Batson purposes were the new limitations on habeas
relief. Under 28 U.S.C. § 22 54 (d)(1), the writ shall not be granted unless the
adjudication of a claim's merits in state court "resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
''M
Additionally, state court decisions can be set aside under § 225 4 (d)(2) when
they have "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.'12
8. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11o Stat. 1214
(codified at scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42, & 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AEDPA].
The author would like to thank Adir Waldman for his invaluable help developing the
arguments in this Comment.
9. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory
authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of
constitutional dimension.").
lo. See Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 352-86
(1997) (discussing how the AEDPA amends federal habeas corpus). For example, the
AEDPA imposed a statute of limitations on habeas petitions, modified law regarding
exhaustion of state remedies, and curtailed the ability of a petitioner to file a second or
successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 224 4 (d), 2254(b)(2)-(3), 22 4 4 (b) (2006).
ii. AEDPA, § 104(3) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 22 54 (d)(1)) (emphasis added).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 22 54 (d)(2).
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The Batson line of cases is the exemplar of such clearly established federal
law.' 3 In its most basic formulation, Batson forbids prosecutors from exercising
peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on account of their race. If
the defense makes a Batson challenge, the trial judge must then apply Batson's
three-step framework.
In Step One, the trial judge must evaluate whether the defense has made a
prima facie showing of racial discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination under Batson, the defendant must show: (1) that he
is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that peremptory challenges have
been used to remove members of the defendant's race from the jury; and
(3) that the facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. 4 If
that showing is made, Step Two requires that the burden shift to the
prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for the strike."5 In Purkett v.
Elem, a key holding in the Batson line of cases, the Supreme Court held that a
race-neutral explanation need not be persuasive, or even plausible, to advance
Batson analysis to the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination. 6 The
reason offered will be considered race neutral in the absence of inherent
discriminatory intent in the prosecutor's explanation. The court then moves to
Step Three and determines whether the moving party has carried the burden of
proving purposeful discrimination. The trial court makes a credibility
judgment in light of both parties' submissions, where credibility is "measured
by, among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or
how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale
has some basis in accepted trial strategy." 7 Under Purkett, it is an error to
combine Batson's second and third steps into one by "requiring that the
13. See, e.g., Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342 (20o6) ("In this case there is no demonstration
that either the trial court or the California Court of Appeal acted contrary to clearly
established federal law in recognizing and applying Batson's burden-framework."); Brinson
v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225, 235 (3d Cir. 2005) ("We hold that the state courts' rejection of
Brinson's Batson claim without proceeding to the second step of the Batson analysis cannot
be sustained under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(i).").
14. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986). In deciding whether a prima facie case
has been raised, the trial judge is to consider such evidence as a prosecutor's voir dire
questions and statements, as well as the pattern of strikes against black jurors. See generally
Stephen R_ DiPrima, Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson and
McCollum, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 888 (1995) (discussing the application of Batson and
McCollum by the federal courts).
15. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
16. 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).




justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also ...a
plausible basis for believing that the person's ability to perform his or her
duties as a juror will be affected."' 8 A Batson violation has occurred if the court
discredits the prosecutor's explanation, or if the defendant can show the
race-neutral explanation to be pretextual. 9 While Batson itself does not offer a
remedy for Batson violations, one common approach judges take is to seat an
improperly stricken juror.2"
In its first reverse-Batson case, Georgia v. McCollum,' the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes by criminal
defendants. In McCollum, three white defendants were charged with the assault
of two African-Americans. Fearing that the defense would strike
African-American veniremen, the prosecution raised a Batson challenge. The
Court held that there was sufficient state action to entitle prosecutors to raise a
Batson claim, primarily because the state oversees and administers the jury
system and criminal defendants invoke state law to exercise their peremptory
challenges. In accepting the prosecution's challenge, the McCollum Court
concluded that the rights of a criminal defendant do not outweigh the interests
articulated in Batson, specifically "that a fair trial" does not include "the right to
discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race."'
While various aspects of Batson have been refined through subsequent
Supreme Court cases, 3 Batson-and correspondingly McCollum-have only
18. 514 U.S. at 768 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See id.; Williams v. Groose, 77 F-3d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1996) (allowing defendant to show
that prosecutor's race-neutral reason was pretextual).
2o. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24 ("In light of the variety ofjury selection practices followed in our
state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to
implement our holding today."); Meagen R. Sleeper, Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court of
Appeals-Mayland's Unfortunate Attempt To Define a Batson Remedy, 57 MD. L. REV. 773,
779-80 (1998) ("[I]n most states, the trial judge has a choice between reseating the
improperly challenged juror or striking the venire and beginning jury selection anew.").
21. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
2z. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57-59. But see id. at 62 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[W]e have exalted
the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it
is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death.").
23. In the decades following Batson, the Supreme Court decided several cases that clarified the
Batson framework. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2oo8); Johnson v.
California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 54S U.S. 231 (2005); Purkett, 514 U.S. at
766; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). Moreover, other groups
were brought under Batson's protection against discriminatory peremptory challenges. See,
e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (women); Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352 (1991) (Hispanics). Batson was ultimately expanded to allow litigants of any
race to make aBatson claim. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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become more deeply entrenched as guarantors of a fair trial. Thus, an
erroneous application of the clearly established law of Batson is deserving of
habeas relief.
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CREATES A SPLIT: HAYES & AKI-KHUAM
To date, only two circuits have ruled on whether trial errors concerning the
application of Batson in a reverse-Batson challenge are even cognizable for
habeas review. Before Hayes v. Conway, 4 courts could sidestep the question by
simply finding there was no misapplication of Batson's three-step process in the
state court proceeding. The facts in Hayes were such that it was difficult for the
court to deny there was a clear misapplication of the Batson test. Accordingly,
the error's cognizability for habeas review was put at issue.
On September 25, 2000, Petitioner Garney Hayes was arrested and charged
with several counts of robbery.2" When Petitioner Hayes was convicted of the
crimes, he filed a timely habeas petition in the Southern District of New York,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 6 He claimed that the state trial court
unreasonably applied the analysis set forth in Batson.7 By doing so, the trial
court erroneously denied defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges against
several jurors, who consequently were seated on the jury that decided
Petitioner Hayes's fate.
Hayes argued that at Step Two of the Batson analysis, the trial court
required defense counsel to present nonpretextual reasons for his peremptory
strikes and then rejected them as discriminatory." In doing so, Hayes argued,
the judge effectively shifted the burden to the defense to prove that its reasons
were not discriminatory; this was in contravention of Purkett, which makes
clear that Step Two simply requires a party exercising the peremptory strike to
come forward with a race-neutral explanation. It is "not until the third step that
the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant." 9 Moreover, the
"ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and
never shifts from, the opponent of the strike."3" Hayes argued that by shifting
to him the burden of persuading that the peremptory strikes were not racially
24. No. 07-3656-pr, 2009 VWL 320188, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 1O, 2009).
25. Hayes v. Conway, No. 05 Civ. 4088, 2007 WL 2265151, at "i (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2007).
z6. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *3.




motivated, the trial court acted contrary to the Supreme Court's clearly
established precedent in Batson and its progeny."
The federal district court denied Hayes's petition, giving deference to the
trial court's Batson determinations. The district judge concluded "the state trial
court adequately followed Batson's three steps," fulfilling the requirements of
"step three" by "hear[ing] again from the prosecutor before making her
ruling." 2 The district court went on to say that "even if. . . the state court
misapplied Batson, the result would only be the denial of a state-created right to
exercise peremptory strikes . . . [which] does not rise to the level of
constitutional error."3 3 Hayes appealed to the Second Circuit raising similar
arguments and was again denied habeas relief. In denying Hayes's habeas
petition, the court relied on United States v. Martinez-Salazar,4 which held that
the right to peremptory challenges is not a federal constitutional right. The
Second Circuit reasoned that "absent allegations that [Hayes] was denied his
right to an impartial jury, the loss of a peremptory challenge alone does not
implicate his Sixth Amendment rights.""5 Ultimately, the Second Circuit held
that because "there is no clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court regarding whether ...the erroneous denial of peremptory
challenges constitutes a due process violation ...denial of two of Hayes's
peremptory challenges cannot provide a basis for federal habeas relief." 6
The holding and reasoning in Hayes directly conflict with the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Aki-Khuam v. Davis.7 In the face of virtually identical facts,
the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion on the question of whether
the improper reversal of peremptory strikes is a cognizable claim on federal
habeas review. In Aki-Khuam, the Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief for a
petitioner who claimed he was denied his peremptory strikes because the
Indiana state trial court had misapplied the Batson test.,8 Like the state trial
court in Hayes, the trial court in Aki-Khuam placed the burden on the defense
to disprove discriminatory intent. The state judge demanded a "plausible
reason that is nonracial, non-gender, nonreligious, non-body language," for
31. Hayes, 2007 WL 2265151, at *1.
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id. at *4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000).
35. Hayes v. Conway, No. 07-3656-pr, 2009 WL 320188, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 1o, 2009) (citing
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)).
36. Hayes, 2009 WL 320188, at *2.
37. 339 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2003).
38. Id. at 529.
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every peremptory strike used during jury selection.39 The Seventh Circuit held
that the trial court had effectively converted the peremptory challenges to
"challenges for cause, which [it] then denied not explicitly because they
appeared to be racially motivated, but rather because [it] was generally
dissatisfied with Petitioner's stated reasons for challenging. 40 The court issued
the writ for habeas relief under § 2254 (d)(1), without even entertaining the
possibility there was no habeas jurisdiction under § 2254(a).
Thus the split between the Second and Seventh Circuits has left open two
questions: (i) whether improper granting of reverse-Batson challenges is
cognizable on habeas review and (2) if so, whether the error merits habeas
relief.
III.JUSTIFYING HABEAS RELIEF FOR REVERSE-BATSON ERRORS
In its holding, the Hayes court reasoned "[b]ecause there is no clearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court regarding
whether . . . erroneous denial of peremptory challenges constitutes a due
process violation, the state court's denial of two of Hayes's peremptory
challenges cannot provide a basis for federal habeas relief."'4' The opinion cited
28 U.S.C. § 2254 for that proposition without specifying the relevant
subsection. The key limitation to the Second Circuit's approach in Hayes is that
it conflates the jurisdictional standards for a cognizable claim in habeas
proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), with the standards for granting the writ, 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (d). In simply citing to "§ 2254," without distinguishing between
subsections (a) and (d), the court erroneously imports the constraints of the
latter into the former.
Under the AEDPA, if a petitioner can show that he or she is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, courts
"shall" entertain his or her application for a writ of habeas corpus.42 At that
point, habeas relief "shall not be granted" for a state court judgment unless the
determination "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
39. Id. at 523.
40. Id. at 529 n.6.
41. Hayes, 2009 WL 320188, at *3-4. Contra Aki-Khuam, 339 F.3 d at 529 ("Petitioner was
deprived of his liberty by a jury whose very creation involved a denial of his statutory and
constitutional rights. Consequently, Petitioner was denied due process and equal protection
of the law . . ").




clearly established Federal law."43 Deviating from the clear text of the AEDPA
is not justified by the argument in the Hayes decision that peremptory
challenges are not a constitutional right. Under § 2254(a), there is no indication
that habeas jurisdiction is available only for constitutionally protected rights;
rather, jurisdiction is available when a prisoner is in "custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."' Nor does § 2254(a) say
that a claim is only cognizable if it violates clearly established federal law; that
phrase is used only in § 2254(d), which dictates when habeas relief should be
granted. Thus, Hayes uses the standard for granting the writ to decide whether
or not a defendant's claim is even cognizable, thereby imposing an undue
burden on the defendant to prove the merits of his claim simply to obtain
review. If the Second Circuit had applied the correct test for cognizability, it
would have found that Hayes's detention was in violation of Batson, and thus
the laws of the United States, warranting habeas review.
Notwithstanding that conflation, the Hayes decision entirely fails to
recognize that the procedure established in Batson and its progeny qualifies as
clearly established federal law for the purposes of § 22 54 (d)(1). To be "contrary
to" clearly established federal law, a state court decision must "arrive[] at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of
law or ... decide[] the case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts." 4' The phrase "clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," limits the law
governing a habeas petitioner's claim to the holdings of the Supreme Court as
they were at the time the relevant state court decision became final. 46 This
limits access to federal habeas in that it does not permit a circuit court to review
habeas petitions based on trial court proceedings that violated the law in its
own circuit, unless the Supreme Court had adopted the circuit's law. The
Batson test was established by the Supreme Court, thereby satisfying the
requirement in § 2254 (d)(1) that the Supreme Court, and not the lower courts,
determine the law. In a situation such as Hayes or Aki-Khuam, where the trial
court rejects defense counsel's race-neutral explanations not because they
demonstrate a discriminatory motive, but rather because they are unreasonable
43. Id. § 254(d)(1)-(2).
44. Id. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides: "(a) The
Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
45- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).
46. Id. at 381.
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or implausible, it applies precisely the standard that Purkett rejects. Thus, when
the trial court plainly misapplies the Batson steps, the result is a decision
"contrary to" clearly established federal law.
As an alternative to § 22 54 (d)(1) relief, a court could grant habeas relief
under S 2254 (d)(2) if it finds the trial court's factual determination to be an
unreasonable determination of facts. The AEDPA provides that for a state court
decision to be based on "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court
precedent, it must correctly identify the governing legal rule but apply it in an
unreasonable manner to the particular facts of that case.47 The standard is for
the state court's application to be "objectively unreasonable," irrespective of
whether the court's application of the governing law was correct.4' Where a
trial judge irrationally attributes discriminatory motive to the defense in
granting a reverse-Batson challenge, there may be grounds to grant habeas
relief under § 22 54(d) (2) as well as (d)(1).
Thus Hayes does not accord with the clear language of the AEDPA, which
allows habeas petitions to be granted based on claims relating to "clearly
established" decisions by the Supreme Court. While the AEDPA is
acknowledged to have meaningfully curtailed habeas jurisdiction, it elevated in
significance the law of the Supreme Court. Batson, its progeny, and the
procedures they establish are considered "clearly established federal law." An
improper application of the Batson test in the reverse-Batson context is a
violation that is not only cognizable for habeas review, but as Aki-Khuam
found, meets the standards for granting the writ.
CONCLUSION
District courts routinely entertain habeas petitions seeking relief on the
grounds that the trial court improperly denied the petitioner defendant's
peremptory strikes.49 If, as Hayes held, these claims are not cognizable on
habeas, then district courts are being unnecessarily inundated with these claims
47. Id. at 413.
48. Id. at 409-10; see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ("[A] decision
adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be
overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence
presented in the state-court proceeding...." (citing S 254(d) (2))).
49. See, e.g., Reynoso v. Scribner, No. CV o8-3554-VAP, 2008 WL 4962863, at *9-11 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 17, 2008) (reviewing a habeas petition arguing that the trial judge wrongfully denied
defense peremptories through misapplication of Batson); Long v. Norris, No. 5 :o6CVoo238,
2007 WL 2021839, at *9-11 (E.D. Ark. July 1o, 2007) (same); Dotson v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ.
7823, 2007 WL 1982730, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 1o, 2007) (same).
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over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction. Conversely, if these claims are
cognizable, then district courts are applying clearly established federal law in
divergent and unreasonable ways. Either alternative necessitates clear guidance
on the cognizability question. This Comment has argued that such claims are
entitled to habeas review.
Additionally, even if there is no constitutional right to peremptory strikes,
Batson and its progeny serve as the clearly established federal law that allow
habeas relief under S 2254 (d). The Second Circuit's opinion erroneously denies
such relief from a trial court's gross distortions of the Batson procedure.
Although the split between the Second and Seventh Circuits sends mixed
signals to lower courts about whether a misapplication of Batson triggers
habeas relief, the language of the AEDPA is clear that it does.
ELINA TETELBAUM
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